In a linear rational expectations two-country model, using an aggregate demand, aggregate supply framework, we analyse the e¡ects of the adoption of an in£ation-targeting regime on exchange rate volatility and the possible scope for policy coordination. This analysis is conducted using optimized interest rate policy rules within a calibrated model. Rules for interest rates that respond either to exchange rates or to portfolio shocks give improved performance and permit gains from international coordination. Optimized Taylor rules perform relatively well.
" Introduction
In£ation targeting has become part of the new orthodoxy on monetary policy. The ingredients are delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank, use of short-term interest rates as the instrument of policy, in£ation targeting, and £oating exchange rates. Individual countries set interest rates independently to meet their own in£ation targets; there is no coordination of policies among countries. This appears to have become a successful recipe for macroeconomic management, at least in so far as in£ation has been low in most of the developed world from the mid-1990s, there has been growth in some countries, most obviously the USA, and exchange rate £uctuations have been the cause of only moderate and intermittent concerns. International coordination of economic policy is conspicuously almost completely absent from the agenda, both among policymakers and in the scholarly world. 1 There is an interesting contrast to be drawn between this new millennial orthodoxy and the one that prevailed around 20 years ago. Then £oating exchange rates ruled, but the nominal anchor was to be provided by control of the money supply. Whether because the economic conditions of the times were more agitated, or because control of monetary aggregates was a less good model for policy, exchange rates were highly volatile in the early 1980s. The swings in the value of the major currencies were the cause of great concern, provoked policy intervention, and stimulated much scholarly analysis. The then young CEPR made international economic policy coordination one of the themes of its research programme in international macroeconomics. 2 The arguments in favour of policy coordination made at that time were based on there being spillovers of the e¡ects of policy between countries under £oating exchange rates. Countries responding independently to a common adverse supply shock would be inclined to rely on the exchange rate appreciation induced by a tightening of monetary policy. The overall result was likely to be too much monetary tightening. In other circumstances, in response to other shocks, independent uncoordinated policy actions might be too weak. Coordinated actions by all countries are able in principle to achieve better results for all.
It remains true under a policy that uses setting of short-term interest rates to achieve an in£ation target in an environment of £oating exchange rates that the spillover e¡ects remain. One of the principal channels of policy transmission in open economies is the exchange rate e¡ect on the consumer price index (CPI) of an interest rate change. Nevertheless there has been relatively little discussion of international coordination of policy to date. This may be because exchange rate volatility is more generally accepted now than it was 20 years ago. In fact exchange rates are currently much less volatile than they were then. It may be because the earlier literature concluded that the gains to be had from coordination were modest.
There has been extensive analysis of in£ation targeting in open economies (e.g. Ball, 1999; Sutherland, 2000; Svensson, 2000) . Indeed, most of the in£ation targeters are small open economies. But there has been little on coordination. The idea of introducing policy responses to asset price bubbles has been mooted by Cecchetti et al. (2000) , largely in response to movements in stock prices and real estate, the US stock market, Japan, southeast Asia and so on, with passing observations on exchange rates. In one of few papers on coordinating macroeconomic policy internationally, Obstfeld and Rogo¡ (2000) examine a fully microfounded model with one-period stickiness in wages and imperfect competition in goods markets. They ¢nd little or no scope for coordination to be bene¢cial. In the present paper we examine models with di¡erent in£ation dynamics that might be induced by overlapping contracts. Monetary policy cooperation is also touched upon by Jensen (2000) , while Tabellini (1995, 2000) discuss policy coordination through institutional design.
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to explore possible e¡ects of coordination of policy among countries that target in£ation using interest rates as instruments of policy. While the principal explicit in£ation targeters are small open economiesöNew Zealand, Canada, Sweden, the UK, Australia, Spainöwe have modelled a world of just two identical economies.
We employ a linear rational expectations two-country model, using an aggregate demand, aggregate supply framework that combines features of the widely used New Keynesian model of output and in£ation with open-economy e¡ects and a set of simple policy rules. We try to answer the following questions. What happens to exchange rate volatility when either or both countries change from a regime where policymakers react directly to deviations of in£ation and output from target to using an in£ation-forecast rule? Does adding a response to the exchange rate directly or to a portfolio shock reduce exchange rate volatility and improve economic performance? Does the establishment of some sort of coordination between countries result in a better outcome for exchange rate stability and welfare?
An issue that we avoid in this paper is that of time-inconsistency. Throughout the paper, policy rules are evaluated on the basis of the longterm performance of the economy. E¡ectively it is assumed that the policymakers are able to commit themselves to carrying out any chosen policy rule. Consequently, the issue discussed by Rogo¡ (1985) , that international monetary policy coordination could be counterproductive, does not arise. His results depend on there being a time-inconsistency problem whose bad e¡ects are worsened when countries coordinate on policy. This does not arise in the present paper.
á Simple Policy Rules
We consider ¢ve di¡erent classes of policy rules. All are interest rate rules, and all are simple rules, in that they make the interest rate dependent on the values taken by a small number of key variables. The exclusive use of interest rate rules for policy rests on the evidence that virtually all industrialized countries' central banks use some short-term (nominal) interest rate as their policy instrument (Walsh, 1998) .
Simple rules have been widely discussed among academics and in wider discussions about monetary policy. It has been argued that, particularly when they include forward-looking elements, they may have some advantages compared with optimal rules (Batini and Haldane, 1999) . First, simple rules may be more robust in the presence of uncertainty about the actual model of the economy (as there always is) than optimal rules, which are typically functions of all the predetermined state variables of the model (Taylor, 1999) . Second, it is argued that simple rules, when including forward-looking variables, can perform almost as well as optimal rules in output and in£ation stabilization, and still enhance transparency and make the central bank more accountable, resulting, therefore, in higher credibility. Of course, because simple rules do not use all the information available they will not in general be optimal (Black et al., 1997) . There is of course a debate as to their descriptive realism. On the one hand, Taylor (1993) has argued that a simple ruleöthe Taylor ruleöis a good description of the Federal Reserve's interest rate policy, and Clarida et al. (1998) have argued that the Bundesbank can be represented as having set German interest rates in response to a few key variables. On the other hand, Ryan and Thompson (2000) remark that no central bank actually uses a simple rule. Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) argue that central banks use all the information available when setting interest rates.
We next brie£y describe each of the interest rate rules used in this paper: an optimized Taylor rule, an optimized Taylor rule with an exchange rate term, an optimized forward-looking rule, an optimized forward-looking rule with an exchange rate term and an optimized forward-looking rule with a portfolio shock.
The symbols used in the following equations are de¢ned as follows: i t , nominal interest rate; p t , in£ation rate; y t , real GDP; q t , real exchange rate; x t , a portfolio shock that a¡ects the exchange rate, described in more detail below in the discussion of our macroeconomic model. All are measured as log deviations from targets except for the nominal interest rate which is in levels. Asterisks denote variables relating to the foreign economy.
Optimized Taylor Rule
The best-known example of a simple rule is the Taylor rule, after Taylor (1993) , in which the interest rate reacts to deviations of output and in£ation from the target:
The main arguments for Taylor rules rest on their simplicity, with the transparency and accountability that the central bank gains thereby, and on the fact that they describe actual monetary policy in several countries since the mid-1980s (see, for example, Taylor, 1993) . Hereafter these rules will be referred to as OTH and OTF for the home and foreign economies, respectively. Ball (1999) , extending the Svensson (1997) and Ball (1997) model to an open economy, concludes that in£ation targets and Taylor rules are suboptimal; di¡erent rules are required because monetary policy a¡ects the economy through the exchange rate as well as through interest rate channels. Therefore one might study the case of a policy rule that adds an exchange rate term to the Taylor rule. This is equivalent to the use of à monetary conditions index' 3 (an MCI) as an instrument rule, i.e. a weighted sum of the interest rate and the exchange rate:
Optimized Taylor Rule for an Open Economy
Hereafter these will be referred as OTQH and OTQF, respectively.
An In£ation-forecast Policy Rule
A variety of views exist as to the appropriate way of representing a regime of in£ation targeting in analyses of this kind. A narrow de¢nition of in£ation targeting that has been set out by Svensson (1997) is as a regime in which the interest rate is set so as to achieve the target value for the forecast of the in£ation rate at an appropriate horizon. In the same vein, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) de¢ne in£ation targeting as`a framework for policy decisions that involves comparing an in£ation forecast to the announced target, thus providing an ªin£ation-forecast targeting'' policy, where the forecast serves as an intermediate target'. They view in£ation targeting as a regime in which central bankers can be modelled as setting interest rates using all available information so as to optimize a welfare function that penalizes deviations from the in£ation target. A slightly looser de¢nition of in£ation targeting, following Batini and Nelson (2000) , McCallum and Nelson (1999a) and others, is as a regime in which the policy instrument reacts to deviations of expected in£ation from target, for a given horizon. On this looser de¢nition, a policy would approximate more closely to that under the narrower de¢nition (strict in£ation targeting) the greater the strength of the response of the interest rate to the deviation from target. It is argued that such forecast-based forward-looking rules well approximate the behaviour of in£ation-targeting central banks.
Several in£ation-targeting countries, including New Zealand, Canada and the UK, base their monetary policy explicitly on in£ation forecasts, using them as an intermediate target (see Svensson, 1997; Batini and Haldane, 1999) . It is argued that in£ation forecasts are likely to be e¡ective intermediate targets. 4 First, they summarize all the information availableöincluding lags in the transmission of monetary policyörelevant to the target variable. Second, they are controllable by policymakers. The relevance of in£ation-forecast rules is supported by the ¢ndings of Clarida et al. (1998) , to the e¡ect that these rules have summarized the behaviour of a number of central banks since 1979.
In our analysis we will take this wider view of in£ation targeting, and represent in£ation targeting as the use of a rule that sets the policy instrument (the nominal interest rate) as a function of the deviations of the in£ation forecast, for a de¢ned horizon, from the target. The loss function is de¢ned below. The policy rule is
where i is the policy instrument and g is the feedback parameter; E t p tj is the expected value for in£ation in period t j, conditional on the information at time t; and j de¢nes the targeting horizon with its length determined by the lags in monetary policy and the role given to goals other than in£ation. In our analysis, and given the lag structure of our model, we assume that central banks set nominal interest rates in response to deviations of the in£ation forecast one period ahead from the target; therefore j 1. These rules will be referred to as FWH for the home economy and FWF for the foreign economy hereafter. There are two important di¡erences between the in£ation-forecast rule and a Taylor rule. First, the in£ation-forecast rule responds to anticipations of future in£ation while the Taylor rule reacts to current or past in£ation. (In our application, it is assumed to respond to current in£ation.) Second, the in£ation-forecast rule does not react directly to the output gap.
In some cases (i.e. for particular assumptions about the structure of the economy) a Taylor rule may provide a means of implementing in£ation targeting. Ball (1997) and Svensson (1997) , for example, show that an optimal forward-looking rule, representing an in£ation-targeting regime, may be written as a Taylor rule, but only when current output and current in£ation contain all the information necessary to forecast in£ation. 
An In£ation-forecast Rule with an Exchange Rate Term
In this speci¢cation the policymakers react not only to deviations of expected in£ation from target but also to deviations of the exchange rate from its long-run equilibrium:
The inclusion of an exchange rate term rests on the argument set forth in Cecchetti et al. (2000) that`central banks can improve macroeconomic performance by reacting systematically to asset prices, over and above their reaction to in£ation forecasts and output gaps'. In our open-economy model, because exchange rate £uctuations a¡ect aggregate spending through the export demand channel and a¡ect the CPI through import prices, the reaction of the policy instrument to deviations of the exchange rate from its equilibrium level can then be justi¢ed on the grounds that it may help in output and in£ation stabilization. Hereafter, these rules are referred as FWQH and FWQF, respectively.
An In£ation-forecast Rule with a Response to the Portfolio Shock
Some authors (Smets, 1997; Cecchetti et al., 2000; Freedman, 2000 ; for example) argue that interest rates should o¡set exchange rate movements only when they result from portfolio adjustments. In their study of asset prices and monetary policy, Cecchetti et al. (2000) claim that, because a portfolio shock to the exchange rate can have long lasting e¡ects on output and prices and therefore destabilize the economy, central banks should systematically react to it.
As mentioned above, there is a widespread view in the literature that the bene¢ts of reacting or not reacting to a movement of the exchange rate depend crucially on the cause of that movement. Smets (1997) , for example, suggests that the reason why the Bank of Canada used an MCI during the 1990s was because the shocks hitting the exchange rate during that period were due to portfolio adjustments, and that under such circumstances it was bene¢cial to allow the induced changes in the exchange rate to modify the choice of interest rates. In order to explore this idea in this paper, we compare the variance of the system when policymakers react to a portfolio shock with the variance of the system when they do not.
Thus, we consider policy rules where the monetary authorities react to a portfolio shock to the exchange rate (FWSH and FWSF, respectively, hereafter):
The analysis is conducted in an aggregate demand and aggregate supply framework, with elements of the widely used New Keynesian model of output and in£ation and including open-economy e¡ects. This framework has emerged in the last decade as broadly consensual and highly useful in the analysis of monetary policy rules (see, for example, Taylor, 1999; Rudebusch, 2000) . As argued by Ball (1999) , one advantage of this framework is its simplicity and realism in the description of the monetary transmission mechanism. We believe that using a more fully microfounded model would impose very high costs in terms of complexity and would therefore be likely to obscure our results. A simple linear model, such as the one used here, has the additional advantage of making the analysis tractable, allowing the direct computation of the variance of the arguments in the loss function, for example. Our primary objective in using this ad hoc model was to include all the relevant channels in the transmission of monetary policy believed to exist in a two-country model and see how the model works under a set of simple policy rules. Amongst its descriptively realistic features is that it captures the widely veri¢ed empirical fact that monetary policy a¡ects output before in£ation (see, for example, Walsh, 1998) . The model has the following structure:
All the variables in the model are log deviations around the steady state, with the exception of nominal interest rates, which are in levels. Variables with an asterisk (*) refer to the foreign economy.
Equations (11) and (12) are dynamic IS curves, of the kind derived by McCallum and Nelson (1999b) , with open-economy elements. These authors show that the IS curves can be derived as the linear reduced form of a fully optimizing general equilibrium model. They include a leading term for output that captures the e¡ects of expected income on today's spending. This feature of the IS speci¢cation is particularly important in our model, where today's shocks to the foreign economy can be passed through expectations of today's home income. The inclusion of lagged output on the right-hand side of the IS equations, although its theoretical derivation is less clear-cut, is widely agreed to account for adjustment costs that result in some output inertia observable in the data. However, at this stage we set a 5 0.
Output also depends negatively on the interest rate and positively on a currency depreciation, in the usual way. The exchange rate is de¢ned as the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic money, such that an increase in q represents a real depreciation of the domestic currency. The inclusion of the foreign country income in the IS curve of each country re£ects the`locomotive' e¡ect of one country on the other. Finally, white noise shocks to the IS curve are considered, n (n Ã ) the country-speci¢c demand shock and z the common shock.
Equations (13) and (14), representing the supply side of the economy, are open-economy Phillips curves. The inclusion of expected and lagged in£ation on the right-hand side of the in£ation equation, in the New Keynesian form, is strongly supported by several authors (McCallum, 1997; Ball, 1999; Svensson, 1999) . The dependence of in£ation on its own lagged value re£ects in£ation persistence, which may result from elements of backward-lookingness in the wage setting process (see Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; Batini and Haldane, 1999) . However, there is no agreement on the degree of in£ation persistence (see Section 5). In£ation also depends on the output gap with a lag. Additionally, the in£ation equations include an open-economy term as in Ball (1999) . In£ation depends on the lagged change in the exchange rate because changes in exchange rates are passed directly to in£ation via the price of imported goods. 6 Finally, e (e Ã )
6 Ball (1999) shows that aggregate in£ation can be represented as a weighted average of domestic and imported in£ation, with weights given by the share of imports and domestic goods in the price index. The in£ation rate depends on changes in the exchange rate, which directly in£uences import prices that enter the de¢nition of the CPI in the following way:
That is, aggregate in£ation is an average of domestic in£ation p d and import price in£ation p m , and 1 À G is the weight of imported goods in the price index.
represents the country-speci¢c supply shock and Z the common shock. These shocks are assumed to be white noise. Equation (15), the uncovered interest parity condition, is expressed in terms of real exchange rates. This condition includes a term, x, that can be interpreted as a portfolio shock, assumed to follow an autoregressive process of order 1, as in equation (18).
Equations (16) and (17) represent the Fisher identity linking the real interest rate, the nominal interest rate and the expected in£ation rate. It is required because central banks can only control nominal interest rates i, but consumption and investment decisions, and therefore aggregate demand, are based on the ex ante real interest rate.
The policy of the monetary authorities is modelled by interest rate rules (see Section 2). Thus the LM curve is redundant; the demand for money is always accommodated at unchanged interest rates.
ã The Monetary Transmission Mechanism in the Model
Because the model's lag structure is fundamental to the analysis to be performed below, the operation of the monetary transmission mechanism is worthy of some words of explanation. An open economy di¡ers from the closed economy case because of the existence of an additional channel: the exchange rate. In a closed economy the real interest rate is the only channel from monetary policy to the real economy and prices. This channel is captured in our simple model in the following way. An increase in the domestic interest rate, for instance, changes the real interest rate, raising the cost of capital, and thereby causing a move in aggregate demandöequation (11). This change in aggregate demand is then transmitted to in£ation through the output gap termöequation (13). In this model there is the additional channel of exchange rates, which can work in two di¡erent ways: ¢rst, indirectly through their e¡ect on exports and consequent impact on the output gap; second, through their direct e¡ect on in£ation through their e¡ect on the cost of imported products. The exchange rate also has an important role in the transmission of shocks between countries.
Given the described lag structure, monetary policy a¡ects the country's current output and it a¡ects in£ation with one lag, through the traditional real interest rate channel, in accordance with the empirical evidence that monetary policy a¡ects output more rapidly than in£ation. And, via the exchange rate channel, it a¡ects current in£ation directly and indirectly, through its e¡ect on export demand, with two lags.
ä Calibration of the Model
The parameter values draw upon the work of several authors mentioned below. There is a lack of consensus in the literature concerning the values that the parameters should take.
One of the parameters in this model for which an appropriate value is most di¤cult to determine is the coe¤cient of in£ation persistence, b 1 . The existence of adjustment costs and overlapping price and wage contracts make it realistic to assume some in£ation persistence. Rudebusch (2000) refers to several studies (Chadha et al., 1992; Fair, 1993; Brayton et al., 1999; Fuhrer, 1997) and concludes that a plausible range for b 1 would be 0X4Y 1. In view of the range of plausible values for b 1 Y and the sensitivity of the results to the value taken by it, we consider throughout our analysis two values, b 1 0X4Y representing a relatively forward-looking in£ation process, and b 1 0X9Y representing more inertial behaviour.
Although there is some empirical evidence supporting the inclusion of lagged output in the IS equation, the uncertainty surrounding an appropriate value and the fact that there is no agreement on its theoretical derivation leads us to set a 1 1 and a 5 0, as suggested by McCallum and Nelson (1999b) .
Another highly uncertain parameter is the coe¤cient on the real interest rate, a 2 . Batini and Nelson (2000) note that its value varies widely in studies of policy rules: for quarterly data, it ranges from 0.2 in Estrella and Fuhrer (1998) and McCallum and Nelson (1999a) , to 6 in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) . Although such a wide range invites sensitivity analysis, we follow Ball (1999) and set a 2 0X6.
The open-economy coe¤cients a 3 , a 4 and b 3 , and their foreign economy counterparts, depend on the economies' degree of openness. The coe¤cient b 3 should re£ect the weight of imported prices in the CPI. Again, we follow Ball (1999) and we set a 3 and b 3 equal to 0.2. The e¡ect of lagged output on the other country's demand, given by a 4 , is related to exports. We set it equal to 0.1.
The parameter on the output gap in the in£ation equation is set equal to 0.4, as in Ball (1999) . The autoregressive parameter in the portfolio shock is assumed to be equal to 0.8. The key parameter values of our Table " Demand equation
Supply equation
baseline simulations are summarized in Table 1 . We assume that shocks to output, exchange rates and in£ation all have a variance of 1.
å Solving the Model
Our multivariate linear rational expectations model is written in the Blanchard^Kahn form (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980) and then solved using the procedure described in SÎderlind (1999), applying a Schur decomposition to the coe¤cient matrix. where O CV eC H . 9 The variance^covariance matrix of the shocks is the identity matrix in line with the speci¢cation above.
The Loss Function
In the search for policy parameters we assume that policymakers seek to minimize the expected value of a loss function that is given by a weighted sum of the unconditional variances of output, in£ation and the change in the policy instrument:
In the baseline simulations, the same weight is given to the variance of output and in£ation, with o 1 1, and half this weight is given to the interest rate volatility term, o 2 0X5, following Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Rudebusch (2000) . We also consider the results of using a di¡erent set of utility weights. The purpose of including the variance of output and changes in interest rates in the objective function is that a considerable body of evidence has grown up to suggest that central banks rarely behave as though in£ation is their only objective (Batini and Haldane, 1999; Bernanke et al., 1999) . Banks such as the Bank of England, while having a primary objective of in£ation stabilization around a target rate, claim that they are not, in the words of Mervyn King,`in£ation nutters'. They also attempt to mitigate £uctuations in output and appear averse to large and frequent movements in interest rates. They seem particularly averse to short-term reversals in interest rate movements. Several authors have argued (see, for example, Mishkin, 1999; Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999) that the central banks' behaviour can be rationalized by the inclusion of the output gap and changes in interest rates along with in£ation in the loss function.
The inclusion of an interest rate smoothing term in the loss function reduces the volatility of the policy instrument and, in the view of Mishkin (1999) and others, re£ects real concerns of policymakers. Various reasons justify these concerns. First, as noted by Weerapana (2000) , in the context of an open economy, the non-inclusion of an interest rate volatility term may generate considerable £uctuations in interest rates as the policymakers use them to eliminate the negative e¡ects of exchange rates. Second, Woodford (1999) provides arguments for the smoothing of interest rates, based on the idea that high interest rate volatility may damage the policymakers' credibility: a succession of small movements of the interest rate in the same direction may enhance public con¢dence in central bankers. Third, and most importantly, in the view of Mishkin (1999) , policymakers are averse to interest rate variability because they are very concerned about ¢nancial stability.
It is important to note that in all the analysis in this paper it is assumed that policymakers can adhere to the policy rules that have been chosen. Questions of time-inconsistency do not arise here. The issues by Rogo¡ (1985) do not apply to our analysis.
Non-cooperative and Cooperative Behaviour by Policymakers
In our analysis, we consider both non-cooperative and cooperative behaviour among policymakers. In the case of non-cooperative behaviour, we look for a Nash equilibrium in policy rules. We assume that each country knows the other's policy rule and optimizes taking it as given. Thus, for example, the domestic policymaker chooses optimal policy parameters (via a grid search), taking as given the policy rule of the foreign country. Knowing (and taking as given) the policy rule of the domestic policymaker, the foreign policymaker then adjusts his own policy rule in order to minimize his loss function. This process is iterated until convergence is attained.
In the cooperative case, we use again a grid search procedure to ¢nd the optimal policy parameters. But now it is assumed that the choice is made jointly with the objective of minimizing their joint loss function:
which is a sum of the individual countries' loss functions, re£ecting the assumption of symmetry.
ae Inflation Targeting and Exchange Rate Volatility
In this section we examine the e¡ects of policymakers' changing from the use of a Taylor rule to the use of in£ation targeting, by one or both countries. We make this assessment for policy rules that react to domestic output and in£ation and then for policy rules that also include an exchange rate term (see Section 2).
Policy Rules without an Exchange Rate Term
We assume here that policymakers do not react to exchange rate movements when setting interest rates. We compare three scenarios. In the ¢rst scenario, both countries use an optimized Taylor rule (OTH/OTF). The policy rules are set out in equations (1) and (2) above. In the second scenario, the home country uses a rule based on an in£ation forecast, while the foreign country continues to use an optimized Taylor rule (FWH/ OTF). The rules are as set out in equations (5) and (2) above. And in the third scenario, both countries use policy rules based on in£ation forecasts (FWH/FWF), as set out in equations (5) and (6) above. The parameters of the optimal rules are calculated assuming non-cooperative behaviour, employing the grid search procedure described in Section 6, and are presented in Table 2 .
It is noticeable that the parameters of the optimized Taylor rule are somewhat di¡erent from those found by Taylor (1993) . We ¢nd that, while the response (l 1 Y r 1 to in£ation is sensitive to the in£ation-persistence parameter b 1 Y it is of the same order of magnitude (1.5) as found by Taylor. The response to the output gap (l 2 Y r 2 ) at 1.3 here is greater than Taylor's ¢gure of 0.5, and not sensitive to in£ation persistence. These di¡erences re£ect di¡erences in the structure of the underlying economic models.
We compute the unconditional variances of the variables of the 
system in each of the three scenarios set out above, for high and low levels of in£ation persistence, and we compute also the value of the loss functions for each case. Table 3 contains the results. A number of features of these results stand out. Notably, a shift from the use of optimized Taylor rules to in£ation-forecast rules by both countries makes them both worse o¡. This is true for both high and low values of the in£ation-persistence parameter, but the deterioration is greater when there is more in£ation persistence. If one country alone shifts from the optimized Taylor rule while the other sticks to it, it will be worse o¡. If these two countries were seen as playing a non-cooperative game in policy rules, then the Taylor rule would be a Nash equilibrium.
The di¡erences between the macroeconomic outcomes are modest. Switching from the Taylor rule to the in£ation-forecast rule (by both countries) causes output to become more variable and in£ation less variable, when in£ation is persistent. But when in£ation is less persistent, the opposite is true: output becomes less variable and in£ation more so. The variance of the interest rate is barely a¡ected by the choice of policy rule. There is a relatively large increase in the variance of the exchange rate when the Taylor rule is replaced by the in£ation-forecast rule, from 4.8 to 6.7 when in£ation is very persistent, and from 5.0 to 5.9 when it is less so.
Comparing the properties of the high-in£ation-persistence and lowin£ation-persistence simulations, the most striking di¡erence is that output is less volatile when in£ation is less persistent. When in£ation is less persistent, the economy can be stabilized more readily.
Policy Rules with an Exchange Rate Term
What happens when policymakers respond to changes in the exchange rate? We continue to assume that each country acts in its individual best interests, and that responses to exchange rate movements are uncoordinated. Again three scenarios are considered, as follows. When both countries use optimized Taylor rules with an exchange rate term (OTQH/OTQF) the rules are as in equations (3) and (4) above. When only the home country uses an in£ation-forecast rule with an exchange rate term while the foreign country uses an optimized Taylor rule with an exchange rate term (FWQH/OTQF) the rules are given by equations (7) and (4). And when both countries use in£ation-forecast rules with exchange rate terms (FWQH/FWQF), the rules are (7) and (8).
Again, the optimal policy parameters are computed for the di¡erent cases and regimes assuming that policymakers behave non-cooperatively. The coe¤cients of the optimized rules are presented in Table 4 . Comparison of Tables 2 and 4 reveals that when policymakers respond additionally to exchange rate movements their Taylor rules respond less aggressively to in£ation and output gaps. The optimized in£ation-forecast rule responds less aggressively to the in£ation forecast when in£ation is persistent, but more aggressively when it is not. The resulting unconditional variances of the variables of the system are set out in Table 5 .
Adding the response to the exchange rate improves overall performance (as measured by the loss function) in every case, as would be expected, since none of these rules is an optimal rule. But the bene¢ts are greater when there is less in£ation persistence rather than more, and when the in£ation-forecast rule is employed rather than the Taylor rule. While it remains true that both countries are better o¡ when they both use the Taylor rule than when they both use the in£ation-forecast rule, the disadvantage of the latter is greatly diminished.
Relative to the scenario in which there is no response to the exchange rate, the variance of the exchange rate is reduced, by between 20 and 30 per cent, roughly speaking. 
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ð Portfolio Shocks and Inflation Targeting
In this section we turn our attention to the relative merits of a policy response to the exchange rate per se and a policy response only to the portfolio shocks that a¡ect the exchange rate. This follows the suggestion of several authors (e.g. Cecchetti et al., 2000; Freedman, 2000) that the policy instrument should only react to exchange rate movements that do not re£ect fundamentals. In this section of the paper, we focus on in£ation-forecast rules rather than optimized Taylor rules. We have already seen the e¡ects of reacting directly to the exchange rate in the context of an in£ation-forecast rule. It results in lower volatility of the exchange rate and in an improvement in welfare, relative to the situation in which there is only a reaction to deviations of the in£ation forecast from target. When in£ation is relatively persistent (b 1 0X9), there is a decrease in the variances of the interest rate and output, while there is an increase in the variance of in£ation. When in£ation is less persistent (b 1 0X4), reacting to the exchange rate results in a reduction in the variances of all three measures.
What happens when the policymakers respond only to the nonfundamental movements (the portfolio shocks) in the exchange rate? The policy rules that include responses to portfolio shocks are FWSH and FWSF set out in equations (9) and (10) above. The optimal coe¤cients turn out to be j 1 K 1 1X73 and j 2 K 2 0X35 in the scenario with high in£ation persistence (b 1 0X9), and j 1 K 1 2X3 and j 2 K 2 0X5 in the low-in£ation-persistence scenario (b 1 0X4). We note that when they react to the portfolio shock rather than to the exchange rate, policymakers' responses to expected future in£ation are less aggressive (the coe¤cient is 1.73 rather than 1.9, and 2.3 rather than 2.9).
The performance of the economy under these rules is set out in Table 6 , part (a). For the more backward-looking Phillips curve (b 1 0X9), reacting to the portfolio shock (column FWS) results in a better macroeconomic performance than does reacting to the exchange rate itself (column FWQ). The interest rate, in£ation and the exchange rate become less variable; output is slightly more variable. There is an improvement in welfare. The value of the loss function falls from 9.075 to 8.934. However, compared with the in£ation-forecast rule (column FW), responding to portfolio shocks has only marginally stabilized in£ation. For the less backward-looking Phillips curve (b 1 0X4), responding to the portfolio shock results in a higher loss (7.303) than responding to the exchange rate itself (7.182). Comparing the columns headed FWQ and FWS for non-cooperative policies in Table 6 it may be seen that the variances of output, in£ation and the real exchange rate all increase. Responding to the portfolio shock when the economy has relatively little inertia makes it more variable. This shows that the results of Cecchetti et al. (2000) on the bene¢ts of responding to such shocks depend on model formulation and parameter values, and may not be robust.
ñ Inflation Targeting and Cooperation
The analysis so far has assumed that the countries act independently of each other in choosing rules for their interest rates. That is, they act noncooperatively. In this section we turn our attention to the scope for cooperative policymaking to achieve better results. We stick with the situation of both countries' using in£ation-forecast rules. Cooperative behaviour is modelled by having the policymakers in the two countries choose jointly the policy parameters that minimize their joint loss function. We ¢rst analyse the scope for cooperation when policymakers react explicitly neither to the exchange rate nor to the portfolio shock, and then we consider policy rules that include these reactions.
Cooperative Rules that Respond Only to Domestic Variables
In the setting analysed in Section 7.1, in which policy rules react only to domestic variables, cooperative behaviour by policymakers results in very similar optimal coe¤cients to the non-cooperative case. When the policy instrument reacts to deviations of the in£ation forecast from the target, we ¢nd that the optimal policy parameter is equal to 2, in both the cooperative and the non-cooperative cases. Although the policy instrument reacts implicitly to the exchange rate, there are no gains from cooperation, independently of the degree of in£ation persistence.
Cooperative Rules that Respond to the Exchange Rate
When policymakers in the two countries cooperate on the design of their in£ation-forecast rules, including an explicit response to the exchange rate, the policy rules have the form FWQH and FWQF set out in equations (7) and (8) above. The optimal parameter values in the high-in£ation-persistence case (b 1 0X9) are g 1 d 1 1X7 for expected in£ation and g 2 d 2 0X3 for the exchange rate. In the low-in£ation-persistence case (b 1 0X4) the corresponding ¢gures are g 1 d 1 2X8 and g 2 d 2 0X5. These cooperative rules are very little di¡erent from the non-cooperative rules set out in Table 5 . They di¡er only in that the response of the interest rate to the in£ation forecast is slightly less strong, 1.7 as against 1.9 in the high-in£ation-persistence case and 2.8 as against 2.9 in the lowin£ation-persistence case. The responses to the exchange rate are not altered by cooperation. So a major bene¢t from cooperative policy here is not to be expected. From the simulations summarized in Table 6 it can be seen that cooperation is bene¢cial only in the high-in£ation-persistence case, and there the gains are modest. The loss falls from 9.075 to 9.004, a gain of less than 1 per cent. When countries cooperate, in this scenario, in£ation becomes more variable and output less variable. The exchange rate also becomes less variable (4.0 as against 4.9). In the low-in£ation-persistence case there are no di¡erences between the non-cooperative and the cooperative outcomes worthy of note.
Cooperative Rules that Respond to Portfolio Shocks
Should the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve Bank of the USA cooperate in the presence of, let us say, an irrational love of dollars? That is the kind of question we explore in this section. That is, we analyse whether there are any gains from reacting cooperatively to a portfolio shock rather than non-cooperatively.
The policy rules once again take the form set out in equations (9) and (10). The optimal policy parameters when both countries react cooperatively to a portfolio shock are j 1 K 1 1X6 for expected in£ation and j 2 K 2 0X4 for the portfolio shock in the high-in£ation-persistence case (b 1 0X9) and j 1 K 1 2X3 for expected in£ation and j 2 K 2 0X5 for the portfolio shock in the low-in£ation-persistence case (b 1 0X4). Note that when policymakers respond cooperatively to the portfolio shock rather than to the exchange rate itself, their response to the in£ation forecast is less aggressive (the coe¤cient is 1.5 rather than 1.7 for b 1 0X9; and 2.3 rather than 2.8 for b 1 0X4). The performance measures for the case where both countries react to the portfolio shock cooperatively are set out in Table 6 . As in the previous case there are no bene¢ts from cooperation in the case of low in£ation persistence.
In the case of high in£ation persistence, cooperation produces modest bene¢ts relative to non-cooperation. The loss falls from 8.934 to 8.896, a gain of less than 0.5 per cent.
"ò Sensitivity to Objective Function Weights
In order to check the sensitivity of the results reported here to the weights used in the objective functions, a set of simulations was carried out in which the weight on output was reduced relative to that on in£ation. The weights in the objective function, equation (21), were changed so that o 1 , the weight on the variance of real output, became 0.2 rather than 1.0 as in the baseline simulations. The weight on in£ation was maintained at 1.0. The consequence of this change for the results was very small. The conclusions of the baseline simulations are una¡ected by this change. The principal e¡ect is that the variance of in£ation is somewhat reduced, and the variance of output somewhat increased, relative to the baseline.
10 But the qualitative comparisons of di¡erent policy rules and between noncooperative and cooperative policies remain unchanged. The results appear to be robust with respect to reasonable variations in the objective function weights.
"" Conclusion
In this paper we have simulated the e¡ects of various policy rules in a world consisting of two open economies with £oating exchange rates. The questions we wish to address concern: (1) the e¡ects of in£ation targeting on exchange rate volatility; (2) the possibilities for reducing exchange rate volatility and improving economic performance by countries' modifying their policy rules to include responses either to movements in exchange rates or to the portfolio shocks that a¡ect exchange rates; (3) the bene¢ts of countries' coordinating their interest rate policies.
Modelling the introduction of in£ation targeting as a shift from the use of an optimized Taylor rule to the use of an in£ation-forecast rule for interest rates, we ¢nd that exchange rate volatility rises substantially (by roughly one-third) and economic performance generally worsens. In£ation becomes less variable, but at the price of greater variability of output and interest rates.
In the context of countries using optimized Taylor rules for policy, introducing a response of interest rates to exchange rate movements brings about a small improvement in overall performance, made up of lower volatility of interest rates o¡set partly by higher volatility of output and in£ation. The volatility of the exchange rate is signi¢cantly reduced. Of all the scenarios we simulated, this one, with countries using optimized Taylor rules augmented by a response to exchange rate movements, despite the absence of coordination of policy between countries, yields the best overall performance when in£ation is not too persistent, and close to the best when in£ation is more persistent.
In the context of countries using in£ation-forecast rules, the introduction of a response of interest rates to the exchange rate brings signi¢cant improvements in performance, whether policy is coordinated or not. These gains result from lower variance of the policy instrument and of output. The exchange rate also becomes much less variable.
Responding to the portfolio shock rather than to the exchange rate itself may have modest bene¢ts, but these depend on a key parameter, the degree of in£ation persistence. If in£ation is highly persistent, then responding to portfolio shocks proves bene¢cial. If in£ation is not very persistent, then responding to the portfolio shock may be less good than responding to the exchange rate itself.
The simulations suggest that modifying policy rules to include a response to portfolio shocks can bring about signi¢cant reductions in the volatility of interest rates and exchange rates, and an improvement in overall performance. In our simulations, the improvements in overall performance typically consist of lower variances of output and interest rates, partly o¡set by slightly higher in£ation variance. Thus we have not shown that an improvement in every dimension of performance can be achieved. But it seems likely that a di¡erent selection of policy rules would be able to achieve this. Our policy rules have been chosen with reference to an objective function that weights output variance and in£ation variance equally, and gives weight to the variance of interest rate changes.
The simulations suggest that further modest gains can be obtained by international coordination of interest rate rules, when these contain some response either to exchange rates per se or to the portfolio shocks that a¡ect them.
In the present paper the analysis has necessarily been limited in its scope, and suggests many questions for further exploration. The model has imposed numerous assumptions. We have tried to choose widely acceptable ones, but inevitably some are more contentious, and the results may be sensitive to some of these. Our analysis reveals the sensitivity of the results to the assumed degree of in£ation persistence. The question of the lag structure is particularly sensitive and worthy of further enquiry, as is the related issue of the transmission mechanism of interest rates.
We have restricted the paper to consideration of a small number of policy rules. While these have the virtue of simplicity and descriptive realism, they raise the problem of operating in a second best world. There are many possible alternative rules that might be compared. It would be interesting to explore the benchmark provided by the optimal state-or shock-contingent policy rules. Our results are based on a particular choice of objective function, and while this attempts to reproduce a consensus view of policy objectives, it would be useful to explore alternatives.
Notwithstanding these cautionary notes, we argue that the paper shows that augmenting interest rate policy rules by responses to the portfolio shocks that a¡ect exchange rates may, depending on parameter values, have bene¢cial e¡ects. This reinforces the case for o¡setting irrational love of dollars' and other non-fundamental movements in exchange rates. It appears that this introduces a degree of surrogate international coordination because, while there are additional gains for explicit international policy coordination, these are very small.
